


Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide



Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of \$144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against cigarette manufacturers. Or consider two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded \$4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights, and the environment, multimillion-dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy. But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors-experts in psychology, economics, and the law-present the results of controlled experiments with more than 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendants conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. The experiments also showed that instead of moderating juror verdicts, the process of jury deliberation produced a striking severity shift toward ever-higher awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; were influenced by whatever amount the plaintiff happened to request; showed hindsight bias, believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting that judges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages. Using a wealth of new experimental data, and offering a host of provocative findings, this book

documents a wide range of systematic biases in jury behavior. It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about punishment.

Get the Gist of How Jurors Decide Damage Numbers Persuasive In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded \$4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendants conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide eBook: Cass R - Amazon Buy Punitive Damages - How Juries Decide Book Online at Low It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide book by Cass R. Sunstein Tort reformers look at outrageously large punitive damages as one of the most visible signs of a justice system gone awry. The rule of law Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide - Cass R - Google Books In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded \$4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide by Cass R - Juries set punitive damages in the first instance in federal court and in the courts of power to decide the amount of punitive damages with trial judges. Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide eBook: Cass R - Amazon UK Particularly when jurors are valuing something other than a concrete expense by assessing non-economic or punitive damages, the process Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide eBook: Cass R - Amazon I. Introduction. Academics can influence the world of practice. In a recent historic decision certifying a nationwide mandatory punitive-damages-only class action Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide - ResearchGate Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide, by Cass R. Sunstern, Reid Hastie, John W. Payne, David A. Schkade, and W. Kip Viscusi (Chicago: The University of